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Most analyses of teacher quality end without any assessment of the economic value of altered teacher
quality. This paper combines information about teacher effectiveness with the economic impact of
higher achievement. It begins with an overview of what is known about the relationship between teacher
quality and student achievement. This provides the basis for consideration of the derived demand for
teachers that comes from their impact on economic outcomes. Alternative valuation methods are based
on the impact of increased achievement on individual earnings and on the impact of low teacher effectiveness
on economic growth through aggregate achievement. A teacher one standard deviation above the mean
effectiveness annually generates marginal gains of over $400,000 in present value of student future
earnings with a class size of 20 and proportionately higher with larger class sizes. Alternatively, replacing
the bottom 5-8 percent of teachers with average teachers could move the U.S. near the top of international









By Eric A. Hanushek 
 
It has become widely accepted that high quality teachers are the most important asset of schools, 
but this recognition has not led to any consensus on the appropriate policies that should be followed to 
ensure that we have a good stock of teachers.  The policy proposals range quite broadly, although 
generally they call either for closer regulation of quality or  for more use financial incentives with little in 
between these two poles.  Remarkably, these policy deliberations seldom include even the most 
rudimentary economic analyses or evaluations.  The focus of most educational policy research and of the 
majority of public discussions of school policy is simply whether or not some school input has a 
significant positive impact on student achievement and not what it might cost or the economic benefits it 
might produce.
1  This paper focuses on the demand side of the teacher labor market in the United States 
and provides baseline estimates of the economic value of improving teacher quality. 
    Much of the discussion about the potential demand for teachers is framed in terms of ensuring 
sufficient numbers of trained teachers.  This, however, is not really the issue, because the U.S. has have 
for a long time trained considerably more teachers than the number of positions that annually become 
open in schools.  For example, in 2000 86,000 recent graduates entered into teaching, even though 
107,000 graduated with an education degree the year before (see Provasnik and Dorfman (2005), U.S. 
Department of Education (2009)).
2  At the same time, many have noted shortages of teachers in particular 
                                                            
1 One notable exception is the long term emphasis by Henry Levin and his co-authors on comparing benefits and 
costs, although this has not developed much traction in policy debates.  See, for example, Levin and McEwan (2001) 
and Belfield and Levin (2007).  An early attempt at benefit-cost analysis in the case of class size reduction is found 
in Krueger (2002), following a conceptually similar approach to one part of the analysis below. 
2 Note that the recently graduated group entering teaching also includes a number of people who graduate with 
degrees other than in education, making the excess supply of education graduates even larger.  Similar differentials 
existed throughout the 1990s, implying that the stock of trained teachers not in the teaching profession is substantial. 2 
 
geographic regions or subject areas, such as math, science, or special education.
3  What usually gets left 
out is anything to do with quality.
4  
The analysis presented below is built on a simple premise:  The key element defining a school’s 
impact on student achievement is teacher quality.  In turn, the demand for teacher quality is derived from 
just this impact of teachers on student outcomes.  Both existing academic studies and the related policy 
discussions devote little thought to the economic value of outcomes, generally relying on the vague 
notion that higher scores on tests are better than lower scores. This analysis puts outcome gains in 
economic perspective.  
Consideration of the economic value of teacher quality is especially relevant for the debates about 
performance pay for teachers and administrators.  Until recently, teacher salary policies have given low 
priority to any consideration of merit pay, generally viewing it as a small add-on to salaries.  As such, it 
was generally viewed as an add-on to the basic pay system and one of the first items to be eliminated at 
any sign of budget pressure (see, for example, Cohen and Murnane (1986)).  In this context, it is useful to 
understand the value of keeping high quality teachers as it provides some bounds on the funding of 
potential pay policies to attract and retain effective teachers. 
  Estimates of the relevant achievement and pay-off parameters are in fact available in the 
literature.  Moreover, the key parameters have been consistently estimated across different studies and 
with considerable precision.  The innovation of this paper is to draw on those parameter estimates to 
produce plausible ranges for the underlying demand for teacher quality. 
  This paper begins with discussion of an overview of what is known about the relationship 
between teacher quality and student achievement.  It then discusses the policy alternatives that have been 
pursued as a motivation for considering performance based policies.  The central part of the paper is 
consideration of the derived demand for teachers that comes from their impact on economic outcomes.   
                                                            
3 Interestingly, these discussions have occurred over a long period of time.  See Kershaw and McKean (1962). 
4 The one possible exception is attention to teachers lacking full certification.  On the other hand, teacher 
certification has not been shown to be closely related to student achievement; see, for example, Goldhaber and 
Brewer (2000), Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008), and Boyd et al. (2008). 3 
 
The	Central	Importance	of	Teachers	
  Literally hundreds of research studies have focused on the importance of teachers for student 
achievement.  Two key findings emerge.  First, teachers are very important; no other measured aspect of 
schools is nearly as important in determining student achievement.  Second, it has not been possible to 
identify any specific characteristics of teachers that are reliably related to student outcomes.  
Understanding these findings is central to the subsequent discussions of policies and their underlying 
economics.   
  The general finding about the importance of teachers comes from the fact that the average gains 
in learning across classrooms, even classrooms within the same school, are very different.
5   Some 
teachers year after year produce bigger gains in student learning than other teachers.  The magnitude of 
the differences is truly large, with some teachers producing 1½ years of gain in achievement in an 
academic year while others with equivalent students produce only ½ year of gain.
6  In other words, two 
students starting at the same level of achievement can know vastly different amounts at the end of a single 
academic year due solely to the teacher to which they are assigned.  If a bad year is compounded by other 
bad years, it may not be possible for the student to recover.   
No other attribute of schools comes close to having this much influence on student achievement.  
The available estimates for, say, class size reduction do not suggest any leverage past the earliest grades 
of school, and then the expected effects are small.  Most of the controversy about the impacts of class size 
focus on whether there is any discernible impact on student achievement (see, for example, Hanushek 
(1999),  Ehrenberg, Brewer, Gamoran, and Willms (2001), Mishel and Rothstein (2002)).  Much less 
attention has focused on the magnitude of any effects or the costs of any reductions.  The largest 
commonly available estimate for class size reduction comes from Project STAR, where Krueger (1999) 
estimates that there is a one-time increase in achievement of approximately 0.22 standard deviations from 
                                                            
5 A summary and evaluation of value-added studies that look at the influence of teachers on achievement gains is 
found in Hanushek and Rivkin (2010c) and discussed more thoroughly below. 
6 Hanushek (1992) finds differences of this magnitude for disadvantaged students found in Gary, Indiana.  For an 
overview of the results of similar studies, see Hanushek and Rivkin (2010c). 4 
 
reducing class size by one-third.  Clearly, reducing class size by this much (eight students per class in the 
Tennessee STAR experiment) would be very expensive, and the comparison must be to alternative policy 
approaches.
7 These issues come back into the discussion below. 
  The related issue is what makes for an effective or ineffective teacher.  The extensive research 
addressing this has found little that consistently distinguishes among teachers in their classroom 
effectiveness.  Most documented has been the finding that master’s degrees bear no consistent 
relationship with student achievement (See Hanushek and Rivkin (2004, (2006)).  But other findings are 
equally as interesting and important.  The amount of experience in the classroom – with the exception of 
the first few years – also bears no relationship to performance.  On average, a teacher with five years 
experience is as effective as a teacher with 25 years of experience.  But, this general result about 
measured characteristics of teachers goes even deeper. When studied, most evidence indicates that 
conventional teacher certification, source of teacher training, or salary level are not systematically related 
to the amount of learning that goes on in the classroom.  For example, two recent high quality studies of 
different preparation and entry routes into teaching compare the impact on student achievement of Teach 
for America (TFA) and other alternative routes into teaching with traditional teacher training (Boyd et al. 
(2006) and Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008)).
8  They find little differences by teacher training 
background. 
  The exception as noted is that during the first one to three years of teacher experience the typical 
teacher will get better at her job (see, for example, Staiger and Rockoff (2010)).  She will develop her 
craft, learn her tasks, learn classroom management, and find ways to help students learn.  The existing 
evidence does not, however, suggest any clear way to provide this experience before entry into the 
classroom or to reduce the adjustments that will need to be made once in the classroom.  For example, 
changes in teacher preparation or more extensive induction and mentoring programs, while plausibly 
                                                            
7 Krueger (1999) provides an economic analysis of class size reduction, suggesting that it is marginally cost-
effective.  These estimates can be compared to the estimates for teacher quality provided below. 
8 Teach for America has attracted a large amount of attention for its ability to attract very high quality entrants from 
the most competitive U.S. colleges and universities (see  below). 5 
 
effective policies, have yet to be shown to significantly alter the early career learning of teachers.
9  
Similarly, even very intensive professional development to help teachers become more effective after they 
are already in the classroom has shown little impact on student achievement.
10 
  The fundamental impact of teacher quality has led many policy makers to focus on the 
implications for the form and level of pay of teachers.  The most common expression of this focus is that 
we should pay sufficient salaries to ensure that there are high quality teachers in all classrooms.
11  Higher 
salaries are viewed as a way of providing incentives to attract and retain the teacher force that we need as 
a country.  This conclusion, however, is not as straightforward as it sounds, given the current structure of 
schools and labor markets for teachers and given limitations on understanding of how to identify effective 
teachers.     
Problems	with	Current	Teacher	Policies	
    Existing policies on the demand side of the teacher labor market combine regulations on entry 
into the profession and political bargaining over salaries.  These policies have not proved effective in 
ensuring uniformly high quality teachers, and there is little evidence that the extensions of these that have 
been proposed will be more effective.  
  Most discussion of teacher policies includes very limited attention to costs except where salary is 
itself the focus of discussion.  In these latter discussions of salaries, moreover, little attention is given to 
teacher effectiveness.  Performance pay has not received extensive evaluation, because the limited use of 
such schemes has until recently constrained researchers’ ability to study alternative pay systems. 
Information about alternative performance pay approaches is  beginning to accumulated.  The use 
of performance pay has been increasing in the United States (Podgursky and Springer (2007)).  This 
                                                            
9 See the experiments in Isenberg et al. (2009).  This study compares a comprehensive induction and mentoring 
program to “business as usual” and finds no gains. 
10 Garet et al. (2008) and Garet et al. (2010) present results of randomized evaluations of intensive professional 
development programs for early reading and for middle school math, respectively.  Neither finds that this 
professional development even when combined with classroom coaching significantly affects student learning. 
11 In an international context, see for example Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2011). 6 
 
increased interest has also led both to experimental studies (Springer et al. (2010)) Additionally, 
international experimentation has led to more recent analyses (see, for example, Lavy (2009) and 
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2009)).  For a direct cross-country analysis assessing the impact of 
different institutions, see Woessmann (2010)  Given the level of activity in this area, information about 
the supply side of the market is likely to increase rapidly, but for now still remains rudimentary. 
Current Certification Policies 
  Today’s teacher policies begin almost everywhere with regulating who can enter teaching through 
a certification process that specifies entry requirements.
12  Yet, existing evidence indicates that using 
regulatory approaches to obtaining “good teachers” is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible.  The 
analyses of teacher characteristics give us little reason to believe that we know enough about consistent 
characteristics or backgrounds of good teachers to set appropriate training and hiring standards.  
Specifically, the underlying idea behind most certification requirements is that we can ensure that nobody 
gets a bad teacher, i.e., that is possible to put a floor on quality.  But doing this requires knowledge of 
characteristics that systematically affect performance. As noted above, however, credentials, degrees, 
experience, and even teacher test scores are not consistently correlated with teaching skill.
13  Thus, 
requirements that only fully certified teachers can enter the classroom – such as included in federal 
accountability legislation (No Child Left Behind Act, or NCLB)– may have little impact on student 
performance, even if achieved. 
Nonetheless, some policy proposals argue for strengthening credentials, i.e., for making the 
standards higher and more rigorous.  For example, some propose ensuring that all certified teachers have 
a master’s degree (National Commission on Teaching and America's Future (1996)).  Indeed, five states 
                                                            
12 For a general discussion of teacher licensing and certification, see Goldhaber (2011). 
13 Some attention has focused on teacher test scores as a potential indicator of teacher quality.  The existing 
empirical evidence suggests that these scores, when available, are more correlated with student achievement than 
other explicit measures of teacher characteristics (Hanushek (2003)).  Nonetheless, the relationship is modest with 
less than half of the estimated parameters of teacher tests on student outcomes being statistically significant and with 
little of the underlying variation in teacher effectiveness being accounted for by test scores. 7 
 
including New York currently require teachers to have an earned master’s degree in order to receive 
permanent certification; an additional 11 states require master’s for optional advanced licenses ( National 
Council on Teacher Quality (2009)).    But, since past evidence shows teachers with a master’s degree are 
not on average more effective than teachers lacking such a degree, these proposals would raise the cost of 
becoming a teacher without a strong expectation that quality would improve.   
  Heightened screens for entry into teaching are also likely to be very costly.  Tightening up on 
entry requirements typically involves increased undergraduate course requirements, perhaps requirements 
for a master’s degree before entering into teaching, and higher test score requirements for entry into 
teacher training or for certification.  Each of these makes entry into teaching relatively more costly.  Other 
things equal, this would reduce the supply of potential teachers by altering choices among existing 
potential teachers.  Of course salary increases could offset any alterations in supply. The magnitude of the 
needed increase would depend on the responsiveness of prospective teachers to salary changes – 
something about which we currently have only rudimentary knowledge. 
A variety of experiments with alternative routes to teaching have gone beyond traditional 
certification.  Indeed, a large portion of current teachers do not come through traditional teacher training 
institutions (Walsh and Jacobs (2007)).  While these programs and their requirements vary widely, they 
do open the door to a broader range of individuals.  The existing evidence on their success or failure is 
nonetheless limited.  Some evidence does come from the Teach for America (TFA) program that recruits 
high performing graduates from generally elite colleges and universities and places them in hard-to-staff 
schools even though they lack traditional preparation and certification.
14 Three careful studies of the 
performance of the TFA teachers show generally positive results for math and equal results for reading 
when compared to traditionally trained teachers (see Raymond, Fletcher, and Luque (2001), Decker, 
Mayer, and Glazerman (2004), Xu, Hannaway, and Taylor (2009)).  Further, Boyd et al. (2006) and Kane, 
Rockoff, and Staiger (2008) compare New York City teachers who entered through different routes 
                                                            
14 For a description of the program, see http://www.teachforamerica.org/. 8 
 
including Teach for America and other alternative certification programs and find little average difference 
in effectiveness. 
15  These results do, however, cast further doubt on the idea of improving teacher quality 
by building on the existing certification requirements. 
Current Salary Policies 
  The second important aspect of teacher labor markets is conpensation.  Standard economic 
models suggest that, in a competitive economy, individuals’ salaries will generally be aligned to their 
productivity.  If one firm does not pay a worker a salary that matches her value in terms of output, another 
competitive firm would pay that amount.  If the firm pays the worker too much for her value, it will not 
be competitive with other firms and will be prone to going out of business.   
  Teacher labor markets, however, differ.  Salaries are determined by collective bargaining between 
teachers’ organizations and their employing school districts.  School districts are not prone to going out of 
business if they pay the wrong amount.
16  Being public activities, schools are always subject to political 
forces, and the goals for school quality depend on governmental decision making about how much quality 
is desired.   As a result, teacher salary decisions are only partially driven by the economic forces that 
underlie salary determination in private, competitive industries.  Demand for school quality is filtered 
through the political process and may or may not accurately represent the true benefits and costs of 
varying amounts of quality, including possible externalities from quality.
17 
  Perhaps the most notable recent pattern in teacher salaries is that they have fallen dramatically in 
relation to the rest of the economy.  The changing position of teachers is clear in salary trends since the 
beginning of World War II.  Compared to the earnings of male college graduates, the average male 
teacher was slightly above the 50
th percentile in 1940.  The average female teacher was close to the 70
th 
                                                            
15 Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008) additionally provide some idea of the cost trade-off of different teacher 
selection policies.  Staiger and Rockoff (2010) evaluate much more stringent retention programs based on value-
added information. 
16 Additionally, there are questions about whether the negotiations between school boards and teacher unions are 
arms-length transactions.  See the various discussions in Howell (2005) and particularly Moe (2005). 
17 The public  demand considerations are also influenced by the fact that aggregate importance of school quality 
appears to exceed the private benefits – probably reflecting externalities through the development of ideas that 
influence economic growth.  See Hanushek and Woessmann (2008, (2010). 9 
 
percentile among college-educated females.  But then male teachers fell precipitously to the bottom third 
of the earnings distribution for college graduates, and female teachers were below average during the 
1960s and close to the relative male position by 1990.  In 2000, less than 30 percent of young males and 
less than 40 percent of young females with a bachelor’s degree earned less than the average teacher (age 
20-29).
18  (Note, however, that these data do not include deferred compensation for teachers, which 
appears to have grown faster in teaching than in private sector employment; Podgursky (2011)). 
  This decline in salaries is mirrored by other measures.  While it is somewhat difficult to trace 
general measures of achievement and ability over time, it appears that teachers are drawn from deeper in 
the group of people going to college and that the best college graduates are not the ones going into 
teaching.
19 
  Some analysts have focused on the current position of teachers in the wage/ability distribution as 
a fundamental issue driving student outcomes.  Barber and Mourshed (2007), for example, identify the 
fact that Finland and South Korea attract top graduates into teaching as a key ingredient to their success 
on international tests.   The source of this recruiting success is, however, unclear, because Finnish 
teachers are not paid high salaries (though Korean teachers are).  Mourshed, Chijioke, and Barber (2010) 
further emphasize the importance of high level recruitment in their analysis of school systems around the 
world that have shown substantial improvement. 
  The costs of returning U.S. teachers to their former position in the salary structure are clearly 
enormous.  While some have suggested that this would be a reasonable policy, no analysis is available to 
indicate what gains in teacher quality would result.   
  Two factors appear to be important in evaluating these salary trends.  First, by most accounts the 
skills needed to be an effective teacher are not necessarily those needed to be successful elsewhere in the 
                                                            
18 Hanushek and Rivkin (2006). 
19 Hanushek and Pace (1995), Corcoran, Evans, and Schwab (2002), Bacolod (2007). 10 
 
economy.
20  While there is uncertainty in this statement because we do not have any clear description of 
what skills are needed to be an effective teacher, we do not find for example that standard measures of 
teacher achievement or ability are closely related to student outcomes even though it is closely related to 
earnings elsewhere in the economy.
21  
  Second, the current structure of teacher pay enters into the political determination of salaries and 
appears to hold down teacher salaries.  The single salary structure that pays all teachers (with the same 
experience and degree level) the same amount quite likely acts to restrain the pay of teachers.  The 
argument from a very simple political economy model, while not fully tested, is straightforward.  Since 
salary contracts are negotiated politically with little discipline from the market, politicians negotiating 
salaries must be able to defend the idea that salary increases are related to improved student outcomes.  
But, under the single salary schedule, teachers (with the same experience and graduate training) receive 
the same pay and increase, regardless of the teacher’s effectiveness.  This situation makes large salary 
increases difficult because the factors that determine pay are unrelated to teacher effectiveness in the 
classroom, and effective teachers would see the same salary increases as ineffective teachers.      
Certainly higher levels of salaries would tend to increase the pool of potential teachers, but the 
impact of that on overall teacher quality depends on the ability of principals and human resource teams in 
districts to choose the best teachers.  Existing evidence, while not definitive, suggests that schools are not 
very effective at choosing the best teachers among the pool of eligible applicants (Ballou (1996), Ballou 
and Podgursky (1997), Staiger and Rockoff (2010)). 
  A variant of policy discussions about salaries is to argue that the right way to set the salaries of 
teachers is to use the market salary for professionals in the open economy as a guide.  At its heart this is 
                                                            
20 The relative earnings of teachers who leave teaching has not been thoroughly investigated.  Scafidi, Sjoquist, and 
Stinebrickner (2006) suggest that teachers do not in general move to higher paying jobs when they leave teaching.  
On the other hand,  Chingos and West (2009) find that more effective teachers are likely to leave for better jobs.   
21 The relationship between measures of teacher test scores and student achievement proves to be very imprecise, 
with teacher tests generally being statistically insignificant in educational production functions and with variations 
in teacher tests explaining little of the variance in teacher effectiveness; see Hanushek (2003).  At the same time, as 
discussed below, there are strong rewards to individual achievement in the general labor market. 11 
 
simply one notion of how to determine a salary level, but it is generally unrelated to any arguments about 
the productivity of people in alternative occupations or about the relative attractiveness of different 
occupations.  To the extent that the overall compensation levels of teachers would be raised by such 
calibration to other professions without affecting the distribution of pay across teachers, it is subject to the 
same questions as the previous arguments about restoring relative pay.   
There is one aspect of this that has specific relevance, however.  It is unclear precisely which 
professional occupations would provide the appropriate comparison.  If the standard is privately 
employed professionals – say, lawyers, doctors, and accountants in private employment – a feature of the 
comparison is the overall structure of employment.  Most private professionals have their salaries set 
much more in line with their individual productivity, so that these occupations have much large 
discrepancies in salaries and have noticeably higher employment risks than are found in teaching.  Thus, 
even if the comparison set of alternative professions were clear, the appropriate way to compare salaries 
under different employment conditions is not. 
A significant feature of virtually all existing discussions of teacher salaries, however, is the 
absence of any linkage to quality as seen through student outcomes.  Certainly discussions of quality are 
used to motivate salary considerations, but little of the existing analysis is very relevant. 
What	is	the	Economic	Value	of	Quality	Teachers?	
  An alternative way to think of the salaries for teachers is to consider the derived demand for 
quality teachers, because that is a way to assess the range of salary options that politicians might 
reasonably consider.  The simplest way to value effective teachers is to note that the demand for teachers 
can be derived from the demand for their product – educated students.  For the most part, teacher demand 
has never been evaluated in terms of the potential gains for students  implied by the economic value of 12 
 
better performance.  Such evaluations, however, provide some idea of the social value of highly effective 
teachers, even if they do not necessarily pinpoint the efficacy of particular salary structures.
22 
The Demand Side Based on Expected Student Earnings 
  Consider the economic returns to a student that follow having greater cognitive skills.  In fact, 
these returns have been frequently estimated through empirical analyses of the earnings gains from 
increased skills.  The most common estimation begins with a standard Mincer earnings model with the 
addition of a measure of cognitive skills (CS) such as: 
(1) 
2
01 2 ln ii i i i i Yr S E x p e r E x p e r C S          
where  i Y  is earnings of individual i, S is school attainment, Exper is potential labor market experience, 
and  is a random error.   When cognitive skills are standardized to mean zero and standard deviation of 
one,   is interpreted simply as the percentage increase in annual earnings that can be attributable to a one  
standard deviation increase in achievement.  This will understate the full impact of achievement to the 
extent that higher achievement leads to higher levels of schooling, but that is generally not considered.
23    
Three parallel U.S. studies provide very consistent estimates of the impact of test performance on 
earnings ( ) for young workers (Mulligan (1999); Murnane, Willett, Duhaldeborde, and Tyler (2000); 
Lazear (2003)). These studies employ different nationally representative data sets that follow students 
after they leave school and enter the labor force. When scores are standardized, they suggest that one 
standard deviation increase in mathematics performance at the end of high school translates into 10-15 
percent higher annual earnings.
24  
                                                            
22 Chetty et al. (2010) note the analogy to pay for CEOs, where their ability to create or destroy significant value 
does not dictate the optimal form of contract incentives.  
23 Murnane, Willett, Duhaldeborde, and Tyler (2000) is an exception for tracing through the indirect effects.  See 
also the discussion of the form of estimation in Hanushek and Zhang (2009).   
24 It is convenient to convert test scores into measures of the distribution of achievement across the population. A 
separate review of the normalized impact of measured cognitive skills on earnings by Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne 
(2001) finds that the mean estimate is only 0.07, or slightly over half of the specific studies here. 13 
 
  Murnane, Willett, Duhaldeborde, and Tyler (2000) provide evidence from the High School and 
Beyond and the National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS72). Their estimates 
suggest that males obtain a 15 percent increase and females a 10 percent increase per standard deviation 
of test performance. Lazear (2003), relying on a somewhat younger sample from National Educational 
Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS88), provides a single estimate of 12 percent. These estimates are also 
very close to those in Mulligan (1999), who finds 11 percent for the normalized AFQT score in the 
National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY)  data. Note that these returns can be thought of as how 
much earnings would increase with higher skills every year throughout the persons’ working career.  The 
estimates do, however, come early in the worker’s career, suggesting the impact may actually rise with 
experience.
25 
  Altonji and Pierret (2001) consider the possibility of statistical discrimination that leads to 
increased returns to cognitive skills over time.  Specifically, when young workers first go to an employer, 
it is difficult for the employer to judge the skills of the worker.  Over time, the employer can more 
accurately assess the skills of the worker, and, if worker skills are related to cognitive skills as measured 
by the tests, the returns to test scores will rise with experience.  Their analysis supports the idea that these 
estimated returns to skills could be an understatement, with the returns to cognitive skills rising and the 
returns to school attainment falling with labor market experience.  When the model was tested across 
countries, however, it seemed most important for the United States but not for other countries (see 
Hanushek and Zhang (2009)). 
  In a different set of estimates using data on a sample of workers for the U.S., Hanushek and 
Zhang (2009) provide estimates of returns ( ) of 20 percent per standard deviation.  One distinguishing 
                                                            
25 These estimates are derived from observations at a point in time.  Over the past few decades, the returns to skill 
have risen.  If these trends continue, the estimates may understate the lifetime value of skills to individuals.  On the 
other hand, the trends themselves could change in the opposite direction.  For an indication of the competing forces 
over a long period, see Goldin and Katz (2008). 14 
 
feature of these estimates is that they come for a sample of workers throughout the career, as opposed to 
the prior estimates that all come from early-career earnings.
26   
Using yet another methodology that relies upon international test scores and immigrants into the 
U.S., Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) obtain an estimate of 14 percent per standard deviation.  That 
analysis begins with a standard Mincer earnings model but estimates the returns to skills from a 
difference-in-differences formulation based on whether the immigrant was educated in the home country 
or in the United States.  They find that skills measured by international math and science tests from each 
immigrant’s home country are significant in explaining earnings within the United States. 
Finally, Chetty et al. (2010) look at how kindergarten test scores affect earnings at age 25-27 and 
find an increase of 18 percent per standard deviation.  These estimates do not control for any intervening 
school attainment differences but do control for a rich set of parental characteristics.   
  The finding that moving a standard deviation in cognitive skills yields 10-20 percent higher 
income may sound small, but these increments apply throughout the lifetime.  In 2010, the average 
present value of income for fulltime, full-year workers age 25-70 is $1.16 million.
27  Thus, one standard 
deviation higher performance even at a low return of 13 percent per standard deviation amounts to over 
$150,000. 
  These estimates of the labor market returns to higher cognitive skills can be merged with 
evidence about variation in teacher effectiveness to calculate the derived demand for teacher quality.   
The basic approach to estimating teacher effectiveness begins with a model of student achievement (A) 
for student i in grade g as a function of lagged achievement, a fixed effect for each teacher ( j  ), and 
other factors (X) that might affect performance as in: 
                                                            
26 The data from the International Assessment of Adult Literacy
 (IALS) provide both tests of reading and numeracy 
skills but also assess a range of adult workers.  The estimates in 
 Hanushek and Zhang (2009) come, like the 
previously mentioned studies, from adding cognitive skills to a standard Mincer earnings function.  But that paper 
also discusses alternative ways to obtain estimates of the schooling gradient (r in equation (1)).
 
27 Calculations use average income by age for all fulltime, full-year workers in the labor force in the first quarter of 
2010.  It is assumed that incomes rise 1 percent per year because of overall productivity improvements in the 
economy and that future incomes are discounted at 3 percent. 15 
 
(2)  1 (1 ) it it j i it AA X          
A central issue in past estimation has been identifying the standard deviation of teacher 
effectiveness from variations in  j  .  A key additional parameter is  , which indicates the depreciation 
rate on prior learning, because this indicates how much of the learning attributable to a teacher carries 
over after the student leaves the classroom.   
  Hanushek and Rivkin (2010c) review recent estimates of the standard deviation in teacher quality 
( w  ), and their estimates are reproduced in Table 1.
28  These estimates, however, look at the variations in 
teacher effectiveness found within schools (hence the subscript w) and do not include any differences 
between schools.
29  The average within school variation in recent studies is 0.17 s.d. for math and 0.13 
s.d. for reading.  The focus on within school variance reflects a concern about identifying teacher quality 
as opposed to unobserved differences among students and families who have selected their school, largely 
through residential location.   
For the subsequent estimation of the impact of teacher quality, an estimate of the total variation of 
quality ( T  ) is used.  In reality, because of difficulties in identifying the between-school variance in 
quality, the subsequent analysis relies on bounds the plausible values of total variation.  A lower bound of 
0.2 s.d. is used and is matched with a plausible upper bound of 0.3 s.d.
30   In this, teacher effectiveness is 
measured in terms of standard deviations of student achievement.  Thus, a teacher who is one standard 
deviation above the mean to the distribution of teachers in terms of quality (i.e., comparing the 84
th 
percentile teacher to the 50
th percentile teacher) is estimated to produce marginal learning gains of 0.2-0.3 
standard deviations of student achievement compared to the average teacher.
31 
                                                            
28 Estimation of  is actually done in a variety of ways and frequently makes some effort to eliminate biases and 
measurement error.  See Hanushek and Rivkin (2010c). 
29 Note that all estimates are corrected for measurement error and, except for Kane and Staiger (2008), rely on just 
the within school variation in teacher effectiveness.   
30 Comparisons of estimated variations within and between schools can be found in Hanushek and Rivkin (2010b). 
31 In terms of the student achievement distribution, this would move a student from the 50





As a base case, consider a teacher who is 0.5 s.d. above average in the teacher effectiveness 
distribution (i.e., at the 69
th percentile), and this level of effectiveness is maintained across school years.  
She would, according to the above estimates, annually lead to a 0.1 s.d. average improvement in cognitive 
skills of her students (assuming that the standard deviation of teacher effectiveness in units of student 
achievement is 0.2 s.d.).   
The implication for earnings depends on the persistence of this learning into the future and how 
this increased learning in any given year carries through into the labor market.  The baseline calculations 
presume that 70 percent of the added learning persists into the future, i.e., that   in Equation (2) is 0.3.   
  
The 70 percent persistence of the annual growth in achievement comes from standard estimates of 
depreciation of learning in educational production functions, but this is subject to uncertainty.  First, the 
estimates of   can be directly influenced by differences in tests across grades, by test measurement 
errors, and other nonlearning matters.  Second, while estimates of   are not always reported in the 
relevant empirical literature, there is a clear distribution of estimates in the literature.   =0.3 is roughly 
consistent with estimates in Hanushek (1971, (1992), Armor et al. (1976), and Boyd et al. (2006).  
Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2009) find estimates closer to 0.4.  Kane and Staiger (2008) find estimates 
of depreciation near 0.5 (with large standard errors) for math, but lower in language arts.  The estimates 
of Jacob, Lefgren, and Sims (2010) for the teacher component of persistence are significantly lower than 
this with   in the range of 0.7- 0. Chetty et al. (2010) find that kindergarten scores carry through to 
young adult earnings – suggesting a much higher persistence of early skills – even though later test scores 
for students do tend to fade.  As a result of this imprecision, the impact of larger depreciation than that in 
the baseline is also investigated in the subsequent sensitivity analysis. 
It is now possible to calculate the value of an above average teacher in terms of effectiveness.  
Combining the improvement in scores for an individual with a conservative estimate of a impact on future 
individual earnings of 13 percent per standard deviation of achievement yields a present value of $10,600 
over a lifetime of work for the average worker. 17 
 
  But this is not yet the full impact of the above average teacher.  The impact on one student is 
replicated across all of the other students in the class.  Thus, calculation of the impact of a teacher 
depends directly on class size.  Table 2 provides the calculated economic value of teachers at different 
points in the distribution and with different class sizes.  Figure 1 displays the impact of different quality 
teachers according to class sizes at varying percentiles of the distribution.
32  A teacher who is at the 60
th 
percentile (0.25 s.d. above average) raises individual earnings by $5,292, and this translates into a present 
value of $105,830 for a class size of 20 students.  A teacher who is one standard deviation above the mean 
(84
th percentile) produces over $400,000 in added earnings for her class of twenty.
33   
  The first thing to note is that this is an annual increment by the teacher.  Any teacher who stays at 
the given level of performance produces such an amount each year.    
  The second thing to note from the bottom half of Figure 1 is that a below average teacher leads to 
a similar decrease in lifetime earnings.
34  Thus, having an effective teacher followed by an equally 
ineffective teacher will cancel out the gains. 
  The precise marginal economic value depends crucially on the three parameters of the teacher 
distribution and of how achievement evolves over time and affects earnings:  0.2 T   ; 0.13   ; and 
0.3   .  It is useful to see how the specific baseline parameters affect the results when we use 
alternative but plausible values.   
  The impact of the different parameters is straightforward.  A lower depreciation rate (higher 
persistence of achievement), a wider distribution of the teacher effectiveness distribution, and a larger 
labor market payoff to skill lead to a larger economic value of teacher effectiveness.  All of the prior 
                                                            
32 None of these estimates introduce any possible offset that would some from direct class size effects.  The 
magnitude of any such effects has been controversial and does not readily permit explicit analysis; see, for example, 
Hanushek (1999), Krueger (1999), Mishel and Rothstein (2002). 
33 Chetty et al. (2010), extrapolating from their data on early career earnings, estimate the impact of a high quality 
teacher at about $214,000 per class of 20 for a teacher one s.d. above the mean.  This is very close to the lower 
bound estimate in Table 3.    
34 The decrease is slightly different because the estimates come from Mincer earnings functions which relate the 
logarithm of earnings to the level of cognitive skills and thus to a slight different percentage change when evaluated 
at a different place in the distribution.   18 
 
estimates were based on rather conservative estimates of  T  , the variation in teacher effectiveness;  one 
standard deviation in teacher effective translates into 0.2 standard deviations in annual student growth.  
As indicated, a plausible upper bound on the variations in effectiveness would be 0.3 standard deviations 
in annual student growth, which would be consistent both with the larger estimates in Table 1 and with a 
more significant between-school variation in effectiveness.  Additionally, the return to skill of 0.13    
most closely mirrors the labor market estimates for young workers and for time periods in the past when 
the demand for skill was less.  More recent estimates and consideration of the full age range of workers 
yields larger estimates, suggesting that  0.2   is a plausible upper bound on the estimates.    The 
baseline estimates do use a depreciation rate of 0.3, whereas a subset of existing production function 
estimates suggest larger depreciation, particularly of achievement gains induced by the teacher.  We thus 
also look at  0.6   , or a depreciation rate that is twice as large. 
  Table 3 presents alternative estimates of marginal impacts evaluated at one point in the teacher 
distribution – one standard deviation above the mean, or the 84
th percentile.  Compared to the baseline, a 
higher depreciation rate on achievement obviously lessens the impact of teacher quality on earnings, 
because this effectively reduces the impact of different teachers.  Nonetheless, even at the lower bound in 
column (1) of the table defined by the previous quality and earnings parameters ( T   and  ) but higher 
depreciation ( ), a good teacher with a class of 15 annually produces $182,000 more in present value 
than the average teacher.  If we scan across the marginal annual economic value of a good teacher 
(compared to the average) evaluated at a given class size – say 20 students per class – we see that the 
parameters do make a large difference in the estimated impact.  The annual economic value with class 
size of 20 ranges from a quarter of a million dollars to a million dollars at the top of the range for the 
three parameters together.  (The final column is an upper bound on estimates based on current empirical 
work). 
  While the difference in estimates across the parameters is large, the more striking feature of the 
table is the magnitude of the lower bound.  A teacher in the top 15 percent with a class of 20 or more 19 
 
students yields at least $240,000 in economic surplus each and every year compared to an average 
teacher. 
  As suggested, the persistence of the annual teacher effects implied by these estimates is an open 
question.  All of the calculations in Figure 1 presume that 70 percent of a teacher’s addition to knowledge 
carries over permanently (except as modified by subsequent school and family inputs).  In reality, maybe 
all carries over, or maybe only a small part carries over.  A host of unknown factors – including 
compensatory behavior of parents and schools, the cumulative nature of skills, the specific attributes 
valued in the labor market, and the nature of peer-classroom interactions come into play in determining 
the long run impact of specific teachers.  But even twice the depreciation of achievement that was used in 
the baseline yields very large estimates of the value of an effective teacher – say, $150,000 per year 
present value for a 75
th percentile teacher with a class of 20 students.  
The Demand Side Based on Aggregate Economic Growth  
  An alternative way of estimating the derived demand for effective teachers focuses on the impact 
of student performance on economic growth.  Recent analysis has demonstrated a very close tie between 
cognitive skills of a country’s population and the country’s rate of economic growth (see the review in 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2008)).    In particular, countries that perform better on international math 
and science tests have stronger growth of their economies.  These analyses suggest that the aggregate 
impact of increased skills is noticeably larger than the individual impact from the prior calculations.
35 
  The magnitude of the effects is truly large.  For the United States, Hanushek and Woessmann 
(2010) calculate that the present value of increased Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from improving 
                                                            
35 The precise reasons for the larger estimates of aggregate effects compared to the micro effects from individual 
earnings are not clear.  These estimates are consistent with substantial externalities from higher cognitive skills, but 
independent estimates of these are unavailable.  The macro estimates reported here assume an endogenous growth 
formation such that increased cognitive skills translate into permanently higher rates of long run growth in GDP per 
capita.  An alternative neoclassical version would relate increased skills to increased factor endowments, leading to 
movement to a higher level of income but one with the pre-reform rate of long run growth.  This latter model yields 
somewhat smaller estimates of the economic gains, but they remain at 70 percent of endogenous growth model and 
still considerably above what would be estimated from the individual earnings parameters.  The alternative 
approaches to estimation is discussed in Hanushek and Woessmann (2008, (2010).      20 
 
scores by 0.25 standard deviations would be $44 trillion.
36  To get some idea of what a difference of 0.25 
s.d. on the international tests means in substantive terms, it is useful to note that Canada is approximately 
0.4 s.d. ahead of the U.S. and that Finland – the current world leader – is approximately 0.58 s.d. ahead.
37 
  Now consider what would be possible if we could eliminate the bottom end of the teacher quality 
distribution and replace these teachers with average teachers.  Following the estimates in Hanushek 
(2009), it is possible to bound the increases in overall performance that could be expected from school 
improvement.  Using the reasonable estimates (above) of variations in teacher effectiveness as measured 
by achievement growth—specifically, 0.20 to 0.30 sd.—it is possible to see the impact of the least 
effective teachers.   
Figure 2 plots the impact on overall student learning of “deselecting” (i.e., moving out of the 
classroom) varying proportions of ineffective teachers and replacing them with an average teacher. These 
calculations come from using the prior variance estimates to judge the impact of truncating the 
distribution.  The analysis applies to all teachers, so it can be thought of improving the effectiveness of 
teachers throughout the system.  As such, it is assumed that the quality of teachers reinforces any gains 
that students make and the impacts of good instruction are not assumed to die out as the student 
progresses to a higher grade.  Instead later teachers build upon the stronger average achievement of all 
children and set their instruction accordingly. 
The figure shows upper and lower bounds on the improvements corresponding to  standard 
deviations of 0.3 and 0.2, respectively.  The wider the distribution of teacher effectiveness the greater is 
the improvement from eliminating the bottom tail of the distribution.   As an example, consider what 
would happen to average student performance if we could eliminate the least effective 5 percent of 
                                                            
36 The key assumptions, described in detail in Hanushek and Woessmann (2010), are that future growth follows the 
patterns of growth for 1960-2000, that school improvement takes 20 years and that the higher skilled people replace 
existing workers as they retire after a 40 year career, and that present values are calculated through 2090 using a 3 
percent discount rate. 
37 These variations come from math performance on the 2006 tests in the Programme for International Student 
Assessment, or PISA (see summary data in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2010)).  
There are some variations in average country scores over time and across subjects, but these do not affect the 
calculations here.  21 
 
teachers from the distribution. The estimates of the impact of teachers on student achievement indicate 
that students would on average gain 0.28–0.42 s.d. of performance by the end of their schooling, 
depending on the bounds of the teacher quality estimates.  
These estimates of the importance of teacher quality permit some calculations of what would be 
required to yield various improvements in student performance.  To begin with, consider what magnitude 
of teacher deselection might yield an improvement in student performance to the level of Canada (0.4 s.d. 
of student achievement). Figure 2 shows that eliminating the least effective 5-8 percent of teachers would 
bring student achievement up by 0.4 s.d.  If the upper bound on teacher effectiveness, corresponding to 
larger differences in effectiveness, is appropriate, replacing the bottom 8 percent of teachers with an 
average teacher would bring the U.S. up to the level of Finland. 
The estimates of the growth impacts of bringing U.S. students up to Finland imply astounding 
improvements in the well being of U.S. citizens.  The present value of future increments to GDP in the 
U.S. would amount to $112 trillion (Hanushek and Woessmann (2010)).  These returns dwarf, for 
example, all of the discussions of U.S. economic stimulus packages related to the 2008 recession ($1 
trillion). 
The estimates are so large for two reasons – the U.S. is currently far from Finland in achievement 
and the U.S. economy is very large.  The increase in achievement for the U.S. would, according to 
historic growth patterns, lift the annual U.S. growth rate by over one percent.
38 
Costs	and	the	Timing	of	Benefits	
  It is clear from the prior calculations that improvements in teacher effectiveness would lead to 
very large economic gains.  The estimates of the economic gains are all put in terms of present values, but 
they do not accrue for some years into the future.  The estimates of individual earnings gains cover the 
                                                            
38 These estimates, particularly for the U.S., are sensitive to the assumptions about the form of the growth model.  
Under the neoclassical model, the low achievement of the U.S. is consistent with its currently being above its long 
run income level.  The U.S. is presumed to be one of the prime contributors to the growth of the technological 
frontier, but the lower implied growth under this model would still yield a present value of economic improvement 
from achievement at the Finnish level of  $62 trillion.  22 
 
entire work life of a current student.  The estimates of the economic gains to the nation consider gains 
across the entire lifetime for somebody born today.   
But it is not appropriate to presume that these changes occur without cost.  At a very simple level, 
if 5-10 percent of teachers were deselected, the risk of entering a teaching career would increase, and it is 
natural to presume that salaries would have to rise to offset this increase in risk.  More generally, it is 
necessary to consider how it might be possible to finance monetary incentives for altering the current 
teacher workforce.  If there are fiscal restraints on governments, say from lowered tax revenues during 
recessionary periods, it would be important to find financing within the current operating budgets for 
schools. 
  The current structure of salaries for teachers pays bonuses for advanced degrees and for added 
teaching experience.  Over time, the teachers with advanced degrees have increased as a proportion of the 
teacher force.  Less than a quarter of all teachers having a master’s degree or more in 1960, but in 2007 
over half of all teachers had some sort of advanced degree.
39  Against this increase, as indicated 
previously, few studies have suggested that having a master’s degree implies higher effectiveness.  
Similarly, median experience has progressively increased since 1960, and currently over 85 percent of 
teachers have more than three years of teaching experience.  Again, little evidence indicates that 
experience after the first few years has any systematic impact on performance.
40 
  The important thing about this increase in teacher education levels and in teacher experience is 
that salaries rise with these factors even though they have no systematic influence on student 
achievement.  Figure 3 shows average teacher salaries by degree and years of experience.
41  A teacher 
with 25 years of experience earns 35 percent more than a teacher with 5 years of experience.  The average 
teacher with a master’s degree earns 18 percent more than a teacher with just a bachelor’s degree.  But, 
neither higher levels of experience nor advanced degrees are related to teacher effectiveness.   
                                                            
39 Information on teacher degrees and experience is found in U.S. Department of Education (2010), Table 68.  
40 See Hanushek (2003) and, more recently, Chingos and Peterson (forthcoming). 
41 The information on salaries  is found in U.S. Department of Education (2010), Table 74. 23 
 
  In 2008, 9.5 percent of total teacher salaries went to bonuses for advanced degrees, while 27 
percent of total salaries went for experience bonuses for teachers with greater than two years of 
experience.  Eliminating or reducing these bonus payments for unproductive background characteristics 
of teachers could obviously free up substantial amounts of funds that could be re-directed toward policies 
to improve the quality of teachers.  The national expenditure in 2007 on bonuses for advanced degrees 
amounted to approximately $19 billion.
42  The total bonuses for teacher experience are roughly three 
times as large. 
  The larger problems may nonetheless revolve around the political costs of any reforms.  The 
previous calculations suggest that considerable value could accrue to improving the quality of teachers.  
Yet the pattern of benefits imply that they are achieved far in the future, long after much of the initial 
costs for reform must be paid and beyond the electoral period for most politicians.  Many politicians have 
in fact pursued school improvement, and spending on schools has risen sharply over the five decades 
(Hanushek and Lindseth (2009)).  The policies introduced have, however, been ones that have direct 
benefits to current school personnel, such as reduced class size or higher overall salaries, although these 
policies have not been ones that have led to higher student achievement.  Moving to alternate policies 
such as differential retention and performance pay of teachers involves greater political costs because 
these policies are generally not supported by the teacher unions. 
Policy	Conclusions	
  The key to interpreting the prior calculations is to recognize that they flow directly from 
increasing teacher effectiveness.  They do not flow from increased teacher salaries unless such salaries are 
used to attract and retain more effective teachers. 
                                                            
42 Total expenditure on instructional salaries in public schools in 2007 was $197 billion, not counting any benefits 
and any degree bonuses to administrators or those providing instructional staff services.  See U.S. Department of 
Education (2010), Table 180. 24 
 
This paper has concentrated on the demand side of the teacher labor market.  The underlying idea 
is that knowing the impact of teacher quality on economic outcomes provides immediate information 
about what kind of rational changes in teacher incentives and salaries are economically desirable.   
Unfortunately, we know little about the supply function for teacher quality.
43  Thus, it is not 
possible to predict what kinds of pay changes would be needed to ensure any given quality of teacher 
force. 
The standard arguments for performance pay suggest the potential value of differential pay based 
on effectiveness in the classroom.  We actually have little empirical evidence about how to structure any 
such pay systems or about what the effects might be.
44  The evidence presented in this paper simply 
suggests that the economically appropriate rewards for particularly effective teachers in the context of a 
performance pay plan could be very large. 
The foregoing analysis has also implicitly suggested an alternative approach to simple 
performance pay that could be more cost effective.  If there is an accurate screen on teacher effectiveness, 
many of the properties of a performance pay scheme can be achieved by eliminating low performing 
teachers and paying the remaining teachers higher but relatively flat salaries. 
The policy of eliminating the least effective teachers is very consistent with the McKinsey 
analysis of the policies found in high-performing school systems around the world (Barber and Mourshed 
2007). Their analysis suggests that the best school systems do not allow ineffective teachers to remain in 
the classroom for long.  These conclusions are also consistent with more U.S. evidence, such as that for 
New York City, in Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008) and the related policy prescriptions in Gordon, 
Kane, and Staiger (2006) and Staiger and Rockoff (2010). 
                                                            
43 There are actually different ways to think about the supply function of teacher quality.  One can put the supply of 
quality into terms related to salary arguments, where selection of teachers in both hiring and retention decisions is 
central.  On this score, no systematic research exists. Alternatively, one could relate quality to the effort made by 
existing teachers.  This focus is central to the early work on merit pay (e.g., Murnane and Cohen (1986)), but has 
also been the key element of more recent evaluations such as Lavy (2002, (2009) and  Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman (2009).   See also the review of performance incentives in Lavy (2007). 
44 A discussion of current pay schemes can be found in Podgursky and Springer (2007).  See also the various 
discussions in Springer (2009). 25 
 
Policies of making active performance-based decisions on retention and tenure are uncommon in 
the current school system. A number of states have laws and regulations that lead to tenure decisions as 
early as two years into a teacher’s career, with the mode being just three years (National Association of 
State Boards of Education 1997, National Council on Teacher Quality 2007). On top of that, the teacher 
evaluation process is typically very cursory (Toch and Rothman 2008).  There is also evidence that 
common evaluation criteria identify very few teachers as being anything but very good (Weisberg, 
Sexton, Mulhern, and Keeling (2009)).These realities are inconsistent with the goal of providing a quality 
education to all students, because some students must necessarily be relegated to these ineffective, and 
damaging, teachers. 
The consideration of the impact of the most ineffective teachers suggests substantial economic 
gains from instituting policies to identify the most ineffective teachers and to move them out of the 
classroom. Developing such policies, negotiating them with teachers, and implementing them in the 
schools would clearly take time.  It would also require both severance packages for those deselected and 
higher pay for those who would then have a more risky job.   
But there are also other policies that are suggested by the economic aspects of teacher quality.  
Specifically, it is important to consider the significant interaction between teacher effectiveness and class 
size – since all of the impacts on individuals are magnified across entire classrooms.  A simple conclusion 
from the estimates is that, even without eliminating any teachers, the most effective teachers should be 
assigned larger classes and the least effective should be assigned smaller classes.  In that way, the 
aggregate impact of less effective teachers is lessened, and the more effective teachers are better utilized.  
Of course, any direct impacts of altered class size would be relevant, but the existing research makes it 
difficult to include that in any systematic manner.  Further, the more effective teachers might react badly 
to having larger classes, which in turn require more work.  Indeed anecdotal evidence suggests that 
schools may try to do the opposite.  If pay is completely constrained, schools may reward the better 26 
 
teachers by giving them smaller classes.  These concerns could be eliminated if teachers are paid a portion 
of their economic returns. 
In the end, there is ambiguity in policy because we have never been able to effectively evaluate 
what the supply function for teacher quality looks like.  This lack of information could, of course, be 
eliminated by a set of pay experiments.  Unfortunately, the current negotiated pay alternatives do not 
seem to be providing much information – in part because they imply salaries that are relatively insensitive 
to effectiveness.   
The bottom line remains that much higher teacher salaries would be economically justified if 
salaries reflected teacher effectiveness more closely.  Without that linkage, we should expect our schools 
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Rockoff (2004)  New Jersey  0.10  0.11 
Nye, Konstantopoulos, and Hedges (2004)  Tennessee  0.26  0.36 
Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005)  Texas  0.15  0.11 
Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007)  Chicago   0.13 
Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008)  New York City  0.08  0.11 
Jacob and Lefgren (2008)  Undisclosed city  0.12  0.26 
Kane and Staiger (2008)  Los Angeles  0.18  0.22 
Koedel and Betts (2009)  San Diego   0.23 




Note:  All estimates indicate the standard deviation of teacher effectiveness in terms of student achievement 
standardized to mean zero and variance one. All variances are corrected for test measurement error and except Kane 
and Staiger (2008) are estimated within school-by-year or within school-by-grade-by-year. Corrected reading 
estimates included for  Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005). 
 
Source:  Hanushek and Rivkin (2010c) 
 
Table	2.		Baseline	Marginal	Annual	Economic	Value	Based	on	Student	Lifetime	Incomes	
( 0.2 T   ; 0.13   ; 0.3   ) 
Teacher effectiveness as s.d. from mean (percentile) 
class size  0.25 (60
th) 0.5  (69
th) 0.75 ((77
th) 1.0 (84
th) 1.25  (89
th) 1.5 (93
rd)
5 $26,458  $53,036 $79,735 $106,556  $133,500 $160,566
10 $52,915  $106,071 $159,470 $213,113  $267,000 $321,132
15 $79,373  $159,107 $239,205 $319,669  $400,499 $481,698
20 $105,830  $212,143 $318,941 $426,225  $533,999 $642,264
25 $132,288  $265,179 $398,676 $532,781  $667,499 $802,831
30 $158,745  $318,214 $478,411 $639,338  $800,999 $963,397
	





0.6     0.3    
0.2 T     0.3 T     0.2 T     0.3 T    
class 
size  0.13     0.2     0.13     0.2     0.13     0.2     0.13     0.2    
5  $60,652  $93,573  $91,215  $140,923 $106,556 $164,741 $160,566 $248,858 
10  $121,303 $187,145 $182,430 $281,847 $213,113 $329,482 $321,132 $497,715 
15  $181,955 $280,718 $273,645 $422,770 $319,669 $494,223 $481,698 $746,573 
20  $242,607 $374,290 $364,860 $563,693 $426,225 $658,964 $642,264 $995,431 
25  $303,259 $467,863 $456,075 $704,617 $532,781 $823,706 $802,831  $1,244,288 
30  $363,910 $561,435 $547,290 $845,540 $639,338 $988,447 $963,397  $1,493,146 
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Source:  U.S. Department of Education (2010), Table 74 
 
	